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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At trial, the following litigants proffer these expert opinions: 
• in a civil case, a plaintiff offers an expert toxicologist who 
states it is possible the plaintiff’s exposure to a chemical 
caused the injuries; and 
• in a criminal case, the prosecution offers an expert in 
fingerprint analysis who states the fingerprint of the 
defendant could not be ruled out as a match to a partial 
print at the scene of the crime charged. 
The two opinions’ admissibility depends on a wide variety of 
factors, including the qualifications of the witness and the reliability of 
the scientific principles the expert uses to provide his or her analysis.  
However, in assessing relevance under the Federal Rule of Evidence 
7021 test in use in federal courts since Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 and in many state courts, judges must use 
varying standards for admission, so the admissibility of the two 
examples could depend on the jurisdiction in which the evidence is 
offered. 
If the expert opinions described above were offered in the State of 
Mississippi, both would be excluded as inadequate under the relevance 
prong of Rule 702.  If offered in the State of Colorado, both opinions 
would be admissible as relevant under Rule 702.  Admissibility in 
federal courts using the Daubert analysis could depend on the appellate 
circuit or on the substance alleged to be harmful in the civil case. 
Since the state and federal courts evaluate expert opinions using 
similar, if not identical, Rule 702 language, the wide divergence of Rule 
702 relevance analysis injects uncertainty into the process and could 
significantly affect the outcome of cases based on the jurisdiction in 
which they are tried. 
A different “split” approach guides Rule 702 relevance analysis in 
Ohio.  The split approach permits expert opinions stated to a possibility 
in criminal cases but requires opinions stated to a probability for civil 
cases; this analysis, unlike the Colorado or Mississippi approach, would 
admit the second proffered opinion described above, while excluding the 
first proffered opinion from jury consideration.  The split approach 
 1.  FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975). 
 2.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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offers significant advantages over the all-or-nothing jurisdictions’ 
interpretations of Rule 702, and therefore, the Ohio model offers a 
sensible approach for courts in other jurisdictions to follow. 
Probability for expert opinions is the correct standard for civil cases 
based on the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.  Among 
other effects, the probability requirement reduces jury speculation, 
avoids absurdity, appropriately adopts legal relevance as the standard for 
admission, and avoids negative effects on the out-of-courtroom practices 
of professionals.  Expert opinions explaining possibilities, while 
inappropriate for civil case consideration, have Rule 702 relevance and 
are useful in criminal cases based upon the beyond a reasonable doubt 
burden of proof. 
Based on an evaluation of federal and state cases, Rule 702, and the 
purposes of expert testimony, the Ohio example of split relevancy 
standards for expert opinions offered in criminal and civil cases is an 
appropriate, reasonable, and sensible approach to Rule 702 relevance. 
II.  FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 AND THE DAUBERT DECISION 
Courts initially evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony 
under common law standards.  In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia established a uniform standard for admissibility of 
expert testimony in Frye v. United States.3  In the Frye case, the court 
stated that scientific information will be admissible when it is well 
recognized and “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”4 
After more than sixty years of preeminence, the Frye general 
acceptance test remained as the standard method for determining expert 
evidentiary admission.5  Judicial analysis of expert admissibility would 
begin to change only well after the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
A.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is Adopted but Frye Remains the Test 
in Federal Courts 
 Initially drafted and approved by Order of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1972, the Federal Rules of Evidence did not take effect until 1975.6  
 3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 4. Id. at 1014. 
 5. ERIC GREEN & CHARLES NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 649 
(1983). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (suspending implementation); Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 
3
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The Federal Rules adopted in 1975 included evidentiary rules for expert 
testimony.  Among the new rules was Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
which, in its initial form, stated: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.7 
In 1972, the Rules Advisory Committee described two major 
considerations under the Federal Rules for determining whether an 
expert should testify.  These considerations contrast with the Frye test, 
which involved a unipolar analysis of the general acceptance of the 
proposed expert testimony to determine reliability. 
First, an expert is appropriate when the expert testimony would 
assist the trier of fact in his or her analysis.  The Rules Advisory 
Committee explained: 
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be 
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman 
would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible 
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a 
specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.8 
Second, the committee answered the question of who is an expert, 
stating that “the fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not 
limited merely to the ‘scientific’ and ‘technical’ but extend to all 
‘specialized’ knowledge.”9  The committee continued, “[t]hus within the 
scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, 
e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group 
Stat. 1926, § 3 (1975) (enacting the rules). 
 7. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).  Since the Daubert decision, the rule was amended to state: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2001) (amendments effective December 1, 2000). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rules (citing Mason Ladd, 
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)). 
 9. Id. 
4
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sometimes called ‘skilled’ witnesses, such as bankers or landowners 
testifying to land values.”10 
By applying the committee notes from 1972, courts could have had 
guidelines on whether an expert should testify.  However, federal courts 
after 1975 had little or no guidance on the interrelationship of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 and the Frye test in determining the admissibility 
of expert testimony.  In the United States v. Abel decision from 1984, the 
U.S. Supreme Court determined that the common law predating the 
Federal Rules continued to determine evidentiary admissibility after the 
1975 enactment of the rules.11  By so ruling, the Supreme Court limited 
the roles of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Advisory Committee 
Notes for another decade, and ensured Frye remained preeminent. 
Into the 1990s, federal courts generally continued to use the Frye 
general acceptance test to determine whether expert testimony would be 
admissible.12 
B.  Daubert in 1993 Determines Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
Replaced Frye 
The test for expert admissibility in federal courts dramatically 
changed with the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13 
In the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Frye 
general acceptance test by determining that the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975 superseded federal common law on 
evidentiary issues.14  Relying on the liberal admissibility standard of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the adoption of a specific rule on the 
admissibility of expert testimony, Justice Blackmun wrote for a 
unanimous court that the austere rule of general acceptance from Frye is 
 10. Id. 
 11. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (issue of impeachment by bias) (citing E. 
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 40, at 85 (3d ed. 1984); 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 341, at 470 (1979); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
EVIDENCE, para. 607[03] (1981)). 
 12. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
912 (1992); United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985).  See also Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).  But see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 
1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). 
 13. 509 U.S. at 587. 
 14. Id. 
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“absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
[and] should not be applied in federal trials.”15 
With the admissibility of expert testimony to be determined by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, federal judges must act as evidentiary 
gatekeepers to ensure expert testimony is both relevant to the issues in 
the case and has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the 
specialty discipline.16 
Daubert described relevance to the case as determined by the “fit” 
of the expert testimony to the case.17  The Court acknowledged that 
“[f]it is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not 
necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”18  The 
Court continued: “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid 
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to 
admissibility.”19 
For the reliability analysis, the Supreme Court stated the general 
role of a court would be to assess preliminarily “whether the reasoning 
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.”20  While many factors bear on this analysis, the Court 
suggested specific factors for the district courts to consider, including: 
scientific methodology or testing, publication and peer-review, the 
known or potential rate of error, the existence of standards and controls, 
and the general acceptance of the methodology within the relevant 
scientific community.21  These factors may be considered by the trial 
judge at a preliminary Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) hearing to assess 
the admissibility of the evidence, and reliability should be shown to a 
preponderance of the evidence.22 
Even if expert evidence is admissible under the relevance and 
reliability test, a court may exclude it if it fails a Rule 403 analysis, i.e., 
when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
 15. Id. at 589. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 591. 
 18. Id. at 591 (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A 
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 258 (1986)). 
 19. Id. at 591-92. 
 20. Id. at 592-93. 
 21. Id. at 593-94.  See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes to the 2000 
Amendments, ¶ 2. 
 22. Id. at 592 & n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)). 
6
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unfair prejudice.23 
The Court emphasized that the Rule 702 inquiry is “a flexible one.  
Its overarching subject is the scientific validity - and thus the evidentiary 
relevance and reliability - of the principles that underlie a proposed 
submission.  The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”24 
With the establishment of the Rule 702 standard for the 
admissibility of evidence, Daubert required that courts make a 
determination of both relevance and reliability of expert testimony prior 
to submission of an expert opinion to the jury. 
C.  Post-Daubert Supreme Court Decisions – Joiner and Kuhmo 
While the Daubert decision offered a dramatic shift in the analysis 
for admissibility of expert testimony in federal court, it failed to provide 
details on the procedural and substantive burdens involved in a court’s 
determination on the reliability and relevance of proposed evidence.  
Additional Supreme Court decisions began to evaluate these closely 
related Daubert issues. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court issued the decision in General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner.25  In Joiner, the Court noted that Daubert established the 
Federal Rules of Evidence as the standard for review of expert 
testimony.26  In doing so, the Daubert decision made the judge the 
“gatekeeper” for screening evidence prior to submission to the jury.27  
The Joiner decision then determined that “abuse of discretion is the 
proper standard of a review of a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”28 
Once the Joiner Court established the abuse of discretion standard, 
the Court then applied the standard to the expert testimony in the case.  
The Court determined the experts’ opinions were relevant to the case by 
finding one expert testified that “it was more likely than not” that the 
Plaintiff’s cigarette smoking and PCB exposure caused his cancer, and 
the other expert stated the cancer was “caused by or contributed to in a 
 23. Id. at 595 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; 
It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F. R. D. 631, 632 (1991)). 
 24. Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted). 
 25. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 26. Id. at 142. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 141-42, 146 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997); 
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879) (“[T]he 
appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”). 
7
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significant degree by the materials with which he worked.”29  However, 
the Court found the opinions unreliable due to lack of proper support 
from several epidemiological studies.30  A court may properly determine 
an expert opinion is unreliable if there is simply “too great an analytical 
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”31  This is because 
“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing 
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”32 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael33 in 
1999 further delineated the process for a district court’s determination of 
admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert.  The Kuhmo Court first 
found that the gatekeeping function of the court applies to not just 
scientific information, but to any scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge testimony under Rule 702.34  The Court then 
affirmed that district courts must make preliminary assessments of the 
relevance and reliability per Daubert, and that district courts must be 
granted latitude in deciding how to assess reliability of proposed expert 
testimony.35  In addition, the Court noted that the witness must initially 
be qualified to provide the expert opinions, which then must be vetted 
for reliability and relevance under Daubert.36 
Following Daubert, the Joiner and Kuhmo decisions clarified both 
the process of reviewing Rule 702 expert evidence in a preliminary Rule 
104(a) hearing, and the substantive requirements for reliability and 
relevance of expert opinions. 
D.  Admissibility Under Rule 702 After Daubert, Joiner and Kuhmo – 
Relevance and Reliability 
Through the Daubert, Joiner and Kuhmo decisions, the Supreme 
Court established the prerequisites to admissibility of expert opinions 
 29. Id. at 143. 
 30. Id. at 144-45. 
 31. Id. at 146 (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)). 
 32. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 33. Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 34. Id. at 147-49. 
 35. Id. at 149 (discussing relevance and reliability under Daubert); Id. at 152 (discussing 
latitude in making reliability determinations); Id. at 158 (noting discretion under FED. R. EVID. 702 
to determine reliability on specific facts of the case). 
 36. Id. at 152 (discussing evaluation of qualifications of the witness done at the trial court 
level, including education of the witness, experience in the field, and experience as an expert in 
litigation). 
8
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under Rule 702.  To make preliminary determinations of admissibility, a 
court may decide to hold a hearing under Rule 104.37  The court may 
choose not to hold a hearing when the reliability of the expert’s methods 
is properly taken for granted.38 
If the court holds a Rule 104 hearing, the court must evaluate the 
reliability of the methods employed by the expert.  The Supreme Court 
in Daubert provided a detailed but not exhaustive list of factors to 
consider for the reliability determination, and later, in Kuhmo 
reemphasized a judge’s ability to consider any information.39 
For the relevance prong of the analysis, the Daubert court 
emphasized the “fit” of the opinions to the case.40  While noting Rule 
702 demands that the testimony relate to a fact at issue so that the 
testimony aids the jury in resolving a factual dispute, the Court did not 
provide guidance as it did with reliability on the specific inquiry or 
analysis needed to establish relevance under Rule 702.41  The Court 
merely stated that it is confident that federal judges can do the 
appropriate review.42 
The relevance prong was poorly defined in the initial Supreme 
Court cases, therefore the U.S. appellate courts have further reviewed 
and defined expert opinion relevance under Rule 702.  Federal appellate 
courts have not been uniform in assigning a substantive burden 
requirement for a litigant to establish the Rule 702 relevance of expert 
testimony. 
III.  RELEVANCE AND RULE 702 – PROBABILITIES VS. POSSIBILITIES AND 
THE STRENGTH OF OPINION ISSUE 
Appellate courts addressing Rule 702 relevance have adopted a 
variety of approaches to the issue.  Many federal appellate decisions 
require expert testimony to rise to the level of probability before being 
 37. Id.; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 592 & n.10 (1993). 
 38. Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 152 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 149-53 (factors in Daubert not definitive); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; supra text 
accompanying note 21.  As part of the reliability prong in Kuhmo, the court discussed the issue of 
qualifications of the expert as well.  Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 153; supra text accompanying note 36.  
Courts would later occasionally classify the qualifications prong of the test as a true third 
assessment, rather than a subsection of reliability.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 40. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
 41. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 42. Id. at 593. 
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admitted at trial.43  On the other hand, several courts of appeal have used 
a more lenient standard and permitted experts to present opinions rising 
only to the level of possibility.44 
On the state court level, different state appellate courts have 
adopted the two varying federal approaches: some states permit experts 
to express opinions to a possibility under Rule 702, while others insist 
on probabilities prior to finding Rule 702 relevance.45  Even modified-
Frye jurisdictions have split on the issue.46  Rejecting the strict 
interpretations, Ohio has adopted a more flexible split approach, 
requiring the standard of expert opinions to a probability for civil cases 
while permitting opinions to the level of a possibility in criminal cases.47 
In contrast to the uniformity and clarity in the Daubert opinion and 
its progeny regarding the Rule 702 reliability analysis and factors for 
reliability consideration prior to admission, the case law on Rule 702 
relevance analysis shows a divergence and disagreement on relevance 
under Rule 702, and provides an opportunity to adopt a uniform 
approach.48 
A.  Federal Law - Probabilities and Possibilities 
Following the Daubert opinion, federal appellate courts have 
inconsistently applied the substantive burden requirement for 
establishing Rule 702 relevance.  Soon after Daubert, the U.S. Courts of 
Appeal in the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit addressed the interplay of 
the substantive burden in a lawsuit and Rule 702 relevance, requiring 
expert testimony to rise to the level of probabilities.  In federal courts, 
this substantive burden initially gained widespread acceptance, but has 
since been questioned as recent federal appellate court decisions admit 
expert testimony rising only to the level of possibilities. 
1.  Daubert and Paoli – Early Opinions and the Probability 
Standard 
After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Daubert in 
1993, the Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for the 
 43. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 44. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 45. See infra Parts III.B.1 (probabilities needed), III.B.2 (possibilities permitted). 
 46. See infra Parts III.B.1. (California), III.B.2 (Illinois). 
 47. See infra Part III.C. 
 48. See infra Part IV. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/1
JURS_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:54 PM 
2008] A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO RULE 702 RELEVANCE 619 
 
Ninth Circuit for determination of the motion for summary judgment.49  
In accepting the remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that 
remand directly to the District Court was necessary, finding that “the 
interests of justice and judicial economy will best be served by deciding 
those issues that are properly before us and, in the process, offering 
guidance in the application of the Daubert standard in this circuit.”50 
The Daubert II court analyzed the proposed expert testimony under 
the new Rule 702 analysis from Daubert, reviewing reliability and 
relevance.51  In addressing the reliability prong, the Daubert II court 
acknowledged the “uncomfortable position” the judiciary occupied in 
making determinations on cutting-edge science.52  By analyzing the 
reliability factors highlighted by Justice Brennan in Daubert, the 
appellate court first weighed the expert toxicology opinion evidence in 
the case and found the reliability of the opinions would have needed to 
be addressed in the district court through the submission of additional 
evidence.53 
The court then shifted to address the substantive burden required to 
show the relevance of expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.  
The court started by finding that the standard in California for 
pharmaceutical torts requires evidence that the medicine ingested caused 
the alleged injuries of birth defects to a preponderance of the evidence.54  
Since the alleged birth defects also occur naturally, the plaintiffs in 
Daubert II had the burden to show that the medication manufactured by 
the defendant caused a doubling of the risk of birth defects.55  When 
doubling was shown, the plaintiffs could state that the medication then 
“more likely than not [is] the source of their injury.”56 
To succeed in the litigation, the plaintiffs must present 
epidemiological studies to prove the higher relative risk of birth defects 
between mothers taking the medication compared to those who did 
 49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F. 3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 
chy of the federal 
rt, however, based on the 
).  In this 
ed injuries are birth defects allegedly caused by ingestion of Bendectin.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 1315.
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  The court also states that “[m]indful of our position in the hierar
judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.”  Id. at 1316. 
 53. Id. at 1320 (reliability need not be presented to the district cou
second prong of the test).  See also infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 54. Id. (citing Jones v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Cal. App. 1985)
case, the alleg
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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not.57  Epidemiological risk must exceed “2.0” to satisfy the substantive 
burden of a preponderance of the evidence stand 58
Epidemiological evidence that fails to show an epidemiological risk 
of “2.0” or higher is not helpful to the case and would only serve to 
confuse the jury if offered to prove causation.59  The Daubert II 
plaintiffs’ experts’ strongest opinions stated that the medication “could 
possibly” have caused plaintiffs’ injuries.60  These opinions, based on 
epidemiological studies, show the medication could possibly cause the 
plaintiffs’ injuries rather than prove the medication probably caused the 
injuries.61  The plaintiffs’ causation evidence, therefore, failed to be 
relevant to the issues in the case, to be determined under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.62  As a result, the expert 
opinions were deemed inadmissible under Rule 702, and the court in 
Daubert II granted summary judgment.63 
Shortly after the original Daubert opinion, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed Rule 702 relevance in In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation.64  Decided before the Daubert II case 
was decided by the Ninth Circuit but after the initial Daubert opinion, 
Paoli discussed the Daubert standard and the interplay of the substantive 
burden of proof in civil cases with the relevance prong of Rule 702 
analysis. 
In Paoli, the court first reviewed the Daubert factors for expert 
admissibility: reliability and relevance.  The court then stated for 
relevance to be established under Daubert and Rule 702, the scientific 
research must connect to the “particular disputed factual issues in the 
case.”65 
In assessing the Daubert fit of the expert testimony to the factual 
issues in the case, the Paoli court then noted the interplay of the 
Pennsylvania requirement for expert testimony to be to a “reasonable 
 57. Id. at 1321. 
 58. Id. (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)).  For a 
greater discussion of the epidemiological risk assessment of “2.0,” see Peter White, A Relative Risk 
2.0: The Ninth Circuit Revisits Daubert’s Epidemiological Standard in In re Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation Litigation, 13 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 33 (2004), and infra text accompanying 
notes 73-79. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1322 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 
1989) (the district court decision in the Daubert opinion line) (emphasis in original). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 65. Id. at 743 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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and 
Daubert.”  
 
degree of medical certainty” and the substantive burden of proof.66  The 
court first found that the issues of burden of proof and admissibility 
often overlap, and that in a prior decision the Third Circuit held that 
expert opinions on “possibilities” or even “strong possibilities” were 
inadequate for Rule 702 admissibility.67 
The Paoli court agreed with prior precedent that the combined 
effect of the substantive burden of proof and Rule 702 requirements for 
expert testimony require that the experts express their opinions to a 
“reasonable degree of medical certainty.”68  As a result, the court 
determined that summary judgment is appropriate when experts cannot 
state to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the illnesses of 
the plaintiffs were caused by the chemicals in question.69  Therefore, to 
the extent that experts would testify to “possibilities” or even “strong 
possibilities,” the testimony is not relevant to the case under the 
combined effect of the civil burden of proof and Rule 702.70 
Following the Daubert II and Paoli decisions, other federal courts 
adopted their reasoning on issues of Rule 702 relevance for expert 
opinion testimony.71  For example, in In re Breast Implant Litigation, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado stated that a 
plaintiff’s causation expert testimony was “no more than a suggestion or 
possibility of a causal relationship, which is insufficient for a causation 
opinion under Colorado law, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
72
 66. Id. at 750-51. 
 67. Id. at 751 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
pinion that chemicals “could” 
r v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 n.4 (3d Cir. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 752. 
 70. Id. at 751 (citing Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208).  For application of this rule in the case to the 
proposed plaintiff’s experts, see id. at 766 (chemicals “only a possible cause” of pregnancy injuries, 
so inadequate to survive summary judgment) and id. at 767 n.34 (the o
have caused the illness is insufficient to survive summary judgment). 
 71. For examples of appellate court decisions, see, for example, Allison v. McGhan Med. 
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (exclusion of expert testimony is appropriate under 
Rule 702 when the expert opinion fails to rise to the level of medical probability); Schudel v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Weisgram v. Marley Co., 
528 U.S. 440, 456 (2000).  For additional similar opinions, see Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
397 F.3d 878, 884 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995)) 
(determining that expert testimony is analyzed to see if it “logically advances a material aspect of 
the case”); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 47 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert II, 43 
F.3d at 1321) (determining how the burden of proof affects the relevance and, therefore, Rule 702 
admissibility of expert testimony); Helle
1999) (citing Paoli, 35 F.3d at 750-52). 
 72. In re Breast Implant Litig.,11 F.Supp. 2d 1217, 1237 (D. Colo. 1998).  For U.S. District 
Court cases with similar reasoning, see Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F.Supp. 2d 814, 822 
(W.D. Tex. 2005); Anderson v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., No. H-95-003, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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With the Rule 702 relevance or “fit” analysis of the appeals court 
decisions in Paoli and Daubert II, opinions of experts will be admitted 
as relevant only when to a probability and will be excluded when expert 
opinions are solely to a possibility.  The initial appearance of consensus 
on the issue faded after newer analysis by additional federal courts. 
2.  Newer Opinions and the Erosion of the Stricter Relevance 
Standard 
Since the Daubert II and Paoli case decisions, decisions by other 
courts of appeal addressing Rule 702 relevance have not required 
probabilities for expert testimony but have instead permitted experts to 
testify to possibilities under Rule 702. 
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit revisited the use of epidemiological 
evidence in mass tort litigation from Daubert II in In re Hanford 
Nuclear Reservation Litigation.73  In the case, the district court insisted 
that the plaintiff show epidemiological evidence to the level of “2.0,” as 
mandated by the decision in Daubert II, in order to show that the 
exposure “more likely than not” caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.74  The 
district court had rejected the expert testimony for lack of Rule 702 
relevance when experts testified the exposure was only “capable of 
causing a disease.”75 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit readdressed the Daubert II Rule 702 
relevance issue, and found that epidemiological proof of causation 
requires a factor of “2.0” to meet the “more likely than not” standard.76  
Even if “2.0” is required to show probability, the court decided the 
district court erred when, relying on Daubert II, it required 
epidemiological proof to rise to the level of “2.0.”77  The court stated 
23259, at *10-11 (S.D. Tex. April 17, 1998); Lowery v. United States, No. 95-T-1614-N, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22840, at *6 (M.D. Ala. October 16, 1996); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., No. 
82-CV-710-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13568, at *16-17 (N.D. Okla. May 28, 1996). 
 73. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Id. at 1131-32. 
 75. Id. at 1132 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993)). 
 76. Id. at 1137 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 167-169 (1st ed. 1994)). 
 77. Id. (citing In re Three Mile Island Lit., 193 F.3d 613, 727 n.179 (3d Cir. 1999)), amended 
by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000)).  For a discussion critical of the standard that the epidemiological 
proof of “2.0” is equivalent to a preponderance of the evidence standard, see White, supra note 58, 
at 49 (citing Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: 
The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64  J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 352-55 
(2001)). 
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that “the validity of a claim should not depend on whether a plaintiff was 
exposed to a fraction of a rem lower than the ‘doubling dose.’”78 
As a result of the Hanford rejection of the Daubert II model for 
epidemiological relevance, expert testimony that admittedly did not rise 
to the level of the “more likely than not” standard would be permitted at 
trial as relevant under Rule 702.  The change represents a profound shift 
from the strict Daubert II approach and permits experts to provide 
opinions that rise only to the level of  possibilities.79 
Similar to Hanford, the Third Circuit in United States v. Ford 
addressed Rule 702 relevance of expert opinions and testimony to 
possibilities.80  In evaluating expert testimony regarding shoe print 
identification, the court determined that the standard for Rule 702 
relevancy is “not that high.”81  The court further decided that the issue in 
the case was whether the impressions of the shoe print was probative of 
the Defendant’s participation in the robbery, and “expert testimony that 
aids the jury to make such comparisons is admissible.”82  Based on this 
analysis, the court concluded that “[a]n expert opinion that expresses a 
possibility that a crime scene impression may have been made by shoes 
worn by the defendant, and otherwise comports with the Daubert 
analysis, is clearly relevant to the question of whether the defendant was 
present at the scene of the crime.”83 
The Ford court rejected the Paoli and Daubert II approach by 
stating that its analysis of Rule 702 relevance is an exhortation to “tread 
carefully when evaluating proffered expert testimony,” but that the 
relevance of the expert opinions presented was not debatable in this 
criminal prosecution.84  Based on Ford, in some cases and 
circumstances, expert testimony regarding possibilities will pass 
relevance examination under Rule 702. 
District court cases mirror the Hanford and Ford decisions in 
rejecting a Rule 702 relevance requirement for expert opinions to be 
stated to a probability, by accepting experts’ opinions on possibilities.  
Even in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, where In re 
 78. In re Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1137. 
 79. The Hanford decision and reasoning was also dispositive in In re Berg Lit., 293 F.3d 
1127, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2002), decided the same day by the Ninth Circuit. 
 80. United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215 (3d. Cir. 2007). 
 81. Id. at 219 (citing Lauria v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 600 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 82. Id. at 220 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. at 220 n.6.  Criminal prosecution as compared to civil litigation is addressed, infra 
section IV.  The issue of possibilities as relevant in criminal prosecution is also seen in United 
States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
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er Rule 
702. 
B.  
d Illinois permitting expert testimony rising to the level of 
possibilities. 
1.  Mississippi and Relevance under Rule 702- Expert Opinions to 
 
Breast Implant Litigation strongly affirmed the language that expert 
opinions to possibilities should be inadmissible under Rule 702, the 
bulwark of probability no longer held firm.  In 2004, Judge Blackburn 
issued his ruling in Kaiser-Hill Co. v. MacTec.85  In the Kaiser-Hill 
decision, the court rejected an objection to expert opinions stated in the 
form of “might” or “may,” since “[t]here is no requirement that an 
expert state an opinion to any particular degree of certainty.”86 
Following the opinions in Hanford, Ford, and Kaiser-Hill, federal 
court review of Rule 702 relevance is unclear on the requirement of the 
substantive level of certainty for expert opinion admissibility.87  
Forming equally divergent viewpoints, state courts have also debated 
and split on the issue of the substantive burden of relevance und
State Appellate Decisions on Rule 702 Relevance 
In addressing Rule 702 admissibility, various states have struggled 
with the substantive relevance burdens established by Daubert-type 
expert opinion analysis.  The State of Mississippi requires expert 
opinions to rise to the level of probabilities before being relevant and 
appropriate for jury consideration, consistent with the first post-Daubert 
federal appellate decisions.  Adopting the opposite approach and 
consistent with more recent federal appellate decisions, Colorado 
adopted a lenient policy for establishing Rule 702 relevance by allowing 
opinions on possibilities to be admissible.  Even when applying 
modified Frye analysis using relevance as a consideration, jurisdictions 
have split on the issue of probabilities and possibilities, with California 
prohibiting an
 85. Kaiser-Hill Co. v. MacTec, Inc., No. 04-cv-02509-REB-CBS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29922 (D. Colo. August 11, 2004). 
 86. Id. at *11 (citing Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1236 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 395 (2005)).  See also Gallegos v. Swift & Co, No. 04-cv-01295-LTB-CBS, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63492, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2006). 
 87. For U.S. District Court cases adopting the reasoning of, or with reasoning similar to, 
Hanford and Ford, see In re Meridia Products Liab. Litig., 328 F.Supp. 2d 791, 801 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 
2004); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Product Liab. Litig., 318 F.Supp. 2d 879, 893 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (applying to general causation, so as not to defy Daubert II); Sullivan, 246 F.Supp. 2d at 704.  
Regarding the issue of criminal cases and arguments over accuracy of expert matching, such as in 
Sullivan, see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 564 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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The ubert that 
expe
ision Catchings v. State, the Mississippi Supreme 
Cour
reme Court recognized 
two 
he Court quotes federal case law for the proposition that 
“the 
 
Probabilities Only in Both Civil and Criminal Cases 
 Mississippi Supreme Court has concluded since Da
rt opinions rising only to the level of possibilities are insufficient to 
be relevant under Rule 702.  In 2007, the prohibition was extended to 
civil cases where expert opinions on medicine not rising to a probability 
were also excluded. 
In the 1996 dec
t addressed Rule 702 relevance in the context of criminal 
prosecution.88  In the case, the treating physician of the crime victim had 
been permitted to testify to the cause of death over an objection.89  On 
appeal after conviction, the defense claimed error in the admission of the 
opinion on relevance grounds under Rule 702.90 
In deciding the issue, the Mississippi Sup
facts to assist their analysis: that the Federal Rules do not conflict 
with the Mississippi Rules so that Federal law on the Rule 702 issue is 
helpful for analysis,91 and that “[w]ithin the medical discipline, the 
traditional standard for ‘factfinding’ is a ‘reasonable medical 
certainty.’”92  With those principles in mind, the court noted exclusion 
of expert testimony for relevance is appropriate in cases where the 
“expert testimony is speculative, [with experts] using such language as 
‘possibility.’”93 
Therefore, t
intent of the law is that if a physician cannot form an opinion with 
sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, neither can a jury 
use that information to reach a decision.”94  Since physicians make 
medical judgments to a “reasonable medical certainty,” expert opinion 
should also rise to the same standard to be admissible at trial.95  While 
making this judgment, the court does caution that the particular phrase 
used should not necessarily be dispositive, but the test for proper 
admissibility is whether the expert’s opinion was to a reasonable medical 
 88. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1996). 
 89. Id. at 596.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 597 (citing Hopkins v. State, 639 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Miss. 1993)).  Mississippi 
adopted the FED. R. EVID. effective January 1, 1986.  West v. State, 553 So. 2d 8, 34 (Miss. 1989). 
 92. Id. at 596 (citing Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Miss. 1981)).  The court 
notes that while the Bethany case predated the adoption of MISS. R. EVID. 702 in 1986, the standard 
has not changed.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 597 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 94. Id. (citing Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208). 
 95. Id. 
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ing Catchings, in 2007 the Mississippi Court of Appeals 
addr
g the issue, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reiterated 
that 
civil 
and 
Daubert, 
with
 
certainty.96 
Follow
essed a Rule 702 relevance issue in the civil case of Kidd v. 
McRae’s Stores Partnership.97  In that case, the claimant appealed the 
trial court’s decision to limit the testimony of claimant’s expert on the 
issue of future medical expenses, when the expert did not testify that 
future surgeries would be needed “to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability.”98 
In decidin
relevance under Rule 702 is based on the expert testimony assisting 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence.99  Then, relying on 
Catchings, the court found that an expert opinion not to a “reasonable 
degree of medical certainty,” or, that is not stated in a way to make the 
opinion probable, is inadmissible as not relevant under Rule 702.100 
Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted for the 
criminal cases Catchings and Kidd, if a physician cannot form an 
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, then the jury cannot 
use the information to determine their verdict.101 
Similar case precedent is seen in a variety of states since 
 courts evaluating relevance under a Rule 702 standard preferring 
expert opinions rising to a probability.  For example, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court in Pruitt v. Powers determined that experts discussing 
causation “should be confined to certain consequences or probable 
consequences, and should not be permitted to testify as to possible 
consequences.”102  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed 
the issue of Rule 702 relevance in Hoy v. DRM, Inc.103  In its decision, 
the court determined that expert testimony that asked the jury to 
determine causation based on possibilities, not probabilities, was 
“plainly . . . not helpful to a jury” and, therefore, not admissible under 
 96. Id.  In this case, medical certainty was found due to the extent the physician in question 
treated the victim for seven weeks after the crime, and the extent of his treatment and involvement 
in the care of the patient.  Id. at 598.  Of course, this is a fact-specific inquiry that is easily avoided 
by the incantation of the “reasonable medical certainty” standard at trial.  In general, opinions not 
stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty are not admissible.  See also West v. State, 553 
So. 2d 8 (Miss. 1989). 
 97. 951 So. 2d. 622 (Miss. App. 2007). 
 98. Id. at 623. 
 99. Id. at 626. 
 100. Id. (citing Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 597 (Miss. 1996)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Pruitt v. Powers, 495 S.E.2d 743, 746 (N.C. 1998) (citing Fisher v. Rogers, 112 S.E.2d 76, 
79 (N.C. 1960)). 
 103. Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268 (Wyo. 2005). 
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vance of expert testimony and the strength of 
opin
g relevance of expert testimony, many states require 
that 
2.  Colorado Model Under 702 - Expert Opinions to Possibilities 
In c pinions are only 
relev
 
the “fitness” prong of the Daubert test.104  To permit the jury to hear 
expert opinion evidence in terms of possibilities is simply “asking a jury 
to speculate,” so such testimony is not admissible.105  Similar case 
decisions come from other states, including Kentucky, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Texas.106 
Courts analyzing rele
ion do not focus uniquely on Rule 702 or Daubert issues.  Some 
states have continued to use a modified Frye analysis after Daubert to 
find that expert opinions must rise to the level of probabilities prior to 
admissibility.107 
In evaluatin
the opinion rise to the level of probability to be relevant under Rule 
702 and admissible at trial, as the federal courts did in Daubert II and 
Paoli. 
Admissible in Both Civil and Criminal Cases 
ontrast to the states that determine expert o
ant under Rule 702 when they rise to the level of probabilities, 
 104. Id. at 1284. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Baylis v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991) (“[E]vidence of 
causation must be in terms of probability rather than possibility. . . .”); Billups v. Leliuga, 398 
S.E.2d 75, 77 (S.C. 1990) (citing Armstrong v. Weiland, 225 S.E.2d 851 (S.C. 1976) (when 
opinions of experts are relied upon for causation, “the expert must . . . state that . . . the injuries most 
probably resulted from the negligence of the defendant”)); State v. Young, No. 01C01-9605-CC-
00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, at *61-62 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998) (citations 
omitted) (“Medical testimony indicating that a certain thing is ‘possible’ generally will not satisfy 
the requirement of Rule 702 that an expert witness’ testimony ‘substantially assist the trier of 
fact.’”); Primm v. Wickes Lumber Co., 845 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. App. 1992) (quoting Lindsey v. 
Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tenn. 1985) (“A doctor’s testimony that a certain thing is 
possible is no evidence at all,” and “the mere possibility of a causal relationship, without more, is 
insufficient to qualify as an admissible expert opinion,” but noting that TENN. R. EVID. 702 is 
slightly different than Federal Rule of Evidence 702)); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 
S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997) (adopting the epidemiological test for causation requiring a “2.0” risk 
to satisfy the more likely than not burden of proof, to help decide a fact at issue under Rule 702). 
 107. California uses the modified Frye standard.  People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal.).  
As for the issue of possibilities and recovery, see, for example,, Simmons v. West Covina Med. 
Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 696, 705-06 (1989) (rejecting “lost chance” theory of recovery, deciding 
that it allows recovery when an adverse result “might possibly” have been avoided) and Dumas v. 
Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1605-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that lost chance theory of 
recovery, allowing recovery on possibilities, would radically alter the meaning of causation).  See 
also Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal. App. 4th 120, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Dumas, 235 Cal. 
App. 3d at 1608-10; Simmons, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 705-6).  For the opposing viewpoint from a Frye 
state, see cases cited infra note 126. 
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dopted the Rules of Evidence effective January 1, 
1980
t evaluated the 
issue
the Colorado Supreme Court 
rever
court held the correct standard for admissibility of 
expe
 
Colorado recently adopted an approach that expert opinions rising to the 
level of possibilities are relevant and admissible in both civil and 
criminal cases. 
Colorado a
.108  Both before and after the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, 
Colorado courts of appeal ruled that expert testimony must rise to the 
level of probabilities before being admissible at trial.109  In 2001, the 
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Rule 702 had replaced Frye as the 
standard for expert opinion admissibility in Colorado.110 
In People v. Ramirez, the Colorado Supreme Cour
 of Rule 702 relevance and the certainty of opinion required for 
expert admissibility.111  In Ramirez, the court faced an appeal of a 
criminal conviction, when at trial the court had permitted an expert 
witness, a pediatric nurse practitioner, to testify to opinions she agreed 
were not to a level of probability.112  On appeal, the court reversed the 
conviction, relying on prior cases requiring opinions to a probability 
prior to being admissible at trial.113 
After accepting certiorari, 
sed.114  The court held that cases decided prior to the adoption of 
the Rules of Evidence in 1979 were superseded by the Rule 702 
standard, and that as a result, the cases after 1979 that relied on those 
older decisions were also overruled.115 
Instead, the 
rt opinions is Colorado Rule of Evidence 702, which requires 
analysis as to whether the evidence is both reliable and relevant.116  
Relevance is determined by examining whether evidence is useful to the 
fact-finder in understanding other evidence or to determine a fact at 
issue.117  Usefulness to the jury hinges on whether there is a logical 
 108. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 375 (Colo. 2007).  
 1990), aff’d, 820 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 
ses in Colorado previously holding expert opinions must rise to the level of 
 to 1979 include Houser v. Eckhard, 450 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo. 
2); People v. Shreck, 22 
 109. See Songer v. Bowman, 804 P.2d 261, 265 (Colo. App.
1991); Thirsk v. Ethicon, Inc., 687 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. App. 1983); Daugaard v. People, 488 
P.2d 1101, 1103-4 (Colo. 1971); Houser v. Eckhardt, 450 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo. 1969). 
 110. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). 
 111. Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 375. 
 112. Id. at 374. 
 113. Id.  For ca
probability, see cases cited supra note 109. 
 114. Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 382. 
 115. Id. at 375.  The cases prior
1969) and Daugaard v. State, 488 P.2d 1101, 1103-4.(Colo. 1971).  The post-1979 cases are 
Songer, 804 P.2d at 265; and Thirsk, 687 P.2d at 1318, which rely on pre-1979 case law. 
 116. Id. at 378 (citing People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)). 
 117. Id. at 379 (citing Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 989 (Colo. 200
20
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tated to a certainty, a less 
than 
inions in Colorado 
risin
ance, permitting opinions on 
poss
relationship between the testimony and the factual issues in the case.118  
The court also notes that, as a part of the reliability analysis, the expert 
need not provide an opinion to a certainty.119 
Therefore, since opinions need not be s
certain opinion is not speculative or inadmissible under the Rule 
702 reliability analysis.120  The Supreme Court then determined that 
once reliability is established, evidence rising only to the level of 
possibilities is admissible as relevant under Rule 702 because it is 
helpful to the jury.121  The testimony from the expert, even if stated only 
to a possibility, could help the jury weigh ambiguous evidence and could 
explain the victim’s statements, so the evidence has a logical 
relationship to the issues in the case.122  As a result, the expert testimony 
is useful to the jury and, therefore, relevant under Rule 702 analysis, 
even when rising only to the level of possibilities.123 
Based on the decision in Ramirez, expert op
g to the level of possibilities will be admissible under Rule 702 as 
relevant in both civil and criminal cases.124 
Colorado’s approach to Rule 702 relev
ibilities, is also seen in a state with a modified Frye approach.  
Illinois continues to adhere to a Frye-based standard.125  Even under the 
Illinois Frye standard, an expert may testify to possibilities at trial.126 
 
P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)). 
, 745 & n.13)). 
 course, is binding precedent and it specifically overrules the interpretation of 
 admissibility in civil case law as well, so it applies to both civil and criminal cases.  
O
721, 731 (Ill. 
03, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)); Matuszak v. Cerniak, 
 118. Id. (citing People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323 (Colo. 2003) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Lit., 35 F.3d 717, 743
 119. Id. (citing Martinez, 74 P.3d at 322). 
 120. Id. at 381. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 382. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Ramirez, of
expert opinion
C LO. R. EVID. 702 applies to both civil and criminal cases.  COLO. R. EVID. 1101(b) 
 125. Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Service Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002) (citations 
omitted); People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2000); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 
1996).  For more on this topic, see C.E. Petit, Illinois Overview, 
http://www.daubertontheweb.com/Illinois.htm. 
 126. Williams v. Manchester, 864 N.E.2d 963, 996 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (Cahill, J., dissenting) 
(citing Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 702 N.E.2d 3
805 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Baird v. Adeli, 573 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991)); Mikus v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 726 N.E.2d 95, 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Wojcik, 
702 N.E.2d at 314); Wojcik, 702 N.E.2d at 314 (“A physician may testify to what might or could 
have caused an injury despite any objection that the testimony is inconclusive.”); Dupree v. County 
of Cook, 677 N.E.2d 1303, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[An expert] can testify in terms of 
possibilities or probabilities as long as the opinion is based on a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty.”) (citing Baird, 573 N.E.2d at 279); Baird, 573 N.E.2d at 290.  For the opposing 
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the opinion should have been excluded and admission of the testimony 
was erroneous.132 
 
While many states require expert testimony to rise to probabilities 
to be relevant under Rule 702, in the Daubert II and Paoli model, 
Colorado recently found the opposite.  It now permits expert testimony 
rising to possibilities as relevant under Rule 702, similar to Hanford and 
Ford. 
C.  The Ohio Split Approach to Rule 702 Relevance 
In contrast to the Mississippi or Colorado approaches, Ohio has a 
split analysis of Rule 702 that requires expert opinions to rise to the level 
of probability in civil cases, under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, but permits possibilities in criminal cases, under the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard. 
Ohio first adopted the Rules of Evidence effective July 1, 1980.127  
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the threshold for relevance of 
expert testimony and the level of certainty of the expert opinion in 
Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc.128 
In Shumaker, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed both the 
substantive burden in civil litigation and the interrelationship of an 
expert’s certainty and admissibility.  On the first issue, the court 
reiterated that in civil litigation the burden is to prove elements of 
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence.129  On the second issue, 
the Shumaker court determined that expert testimony must be excluded 
as speculative if the expert cannot state the opinion to a probability.130  
The basis of the probability requirement is: “[p]roof of possibility is not 
sufficient to establish a fact; probability is necessary” and “[p]robable is 
more than 50% of actual.”131  Since the plaintiff’s expert in Shumaker 
testified that the chemical exposure could have caused plaintiff’s injury, 
viewpoint from a different Frye state, see cases cited supra note 107. 
 127. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1339 (Ohio 1998).  While maintaining a Frye standard 
until after Daubert, Ohio has since accepted Rule 702 as the correct approach to admissibility of 
Charity, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971)). 
.E.2d 793 
uhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio 1938)). 
n case precedent. 
expert testimony.  Id.; Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio 1998).  For more on 
this topic, see Daniel S. Fridman & J. Scott Janoe, The State of Judicial Gatekeeping in Ohio, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/daubert/oh.htm. 
 128. Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 44 (Ohio 1986). 
 129. Id. at 46 (citing Cooper v. Sisters of 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 46 n.3 (citing Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103; Drew v. Indus. Comm., 26 N
(Ohio 1940); K
 132. Id. at 47.  While the FED. R. EVID. had been adopted by Ohio at the time, it should be 
noted that the court did not cite them in this area, relying instead o
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issibility from Shumaker in its 1993 opinion in State 
v. D
ourt stated that prior opinions held that expert testimony to 
poss
osio made a choice to separate the level of expert certainty 
requ
ony on possibilities as relevant 
unde
“could have been on the objects” in evidence at some time was properly 
The Ohio Supreme Court again addressed the issue of expert 
relevance and adm
’Ambrosio.133  Following a conviction for murder, the defendant 
appealed on a number of issues including the admission of expert 
testimony by a prosecution expert, the Cuyahoga County Coroner, Dr. 
Elizabeth Balraj.134  Dr. Balraj testified that it was “physically possible 
that all the wounds could have been made by” the knife in evidence.135  
Defendant appealed on the issue, arguing that the expert’s opinion to a 
possibility was purely speculative and therefore inadmissible under Ohio 
law. 
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed.  Citing Shumaker, 
the C
ibilities rather than probabilities is inadmissible.136  However, the 
court then stated: “we believe that the better practice, especially in 
criminal cases, is to let experts testify in terms of possibility.”137  
Because Rule 702 allows expert opinion to the extent it helps the trier of 
fact to understand an issue or determine a fact at issue, expert opinions 
to a possibility may be admitted.138  Since Dr. Balraj’s testimony helped 
to explain that the victim’s wounds could have been caused by the knife 
in evidence, despite contrary appearances, the testimony helped the jury 
understand the evidence in the case.139  As a result, the trial court 
properly admitted the opinion of the coroner in D’Ambrosio under Rule 
702.140 
However, in making that determination, the Ohio Supreme Court in 
D’Ambr
ired for Rule 702 admissibility in civil and criminal cases.  The 
dichotomy remains in Ohio law today. 
Criminal cases in Ohio continue to adhere to the D’Ambrosio 
standard permitting expert opinion testim
r Rule 702.  In State v. Allen, the Ohio Supreme Court determined 
that the admission of a prosecution expert’s opinion that blood possibly 
 
 133. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909 (Ohio 1993). 
 134. Id. at 915. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. 504 N.E.2d 44, 44 (Ohio 1986)). 
 137. Id. (citing PAUL C. GIANELLI, OHIO EVIDENCE MANUAL 98 § 702.05 (1998); LOUIS A. 
JACOBS, OHIO EVIDENCE 168 § 702-03 (1989)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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te court held that, when 
prese
into account 
the 
 science, skill, trade, or like questions 
 
admitted.141  In State v. Emerick, a court of appeals ruled that a 
prosecution expert’s testimony that the victim’s death was caused by 
either exposure, suffocation, or a combination of the two was admissible 
at trial.142  Finally, in State v. Jones from 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court 
faced an objection to expert testimony because the experts’ opinions 
lacked the appropriate degree of scientific certainty.143  Citing 
D’Ambrosio, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in 
admitting the opinions, and found no error.144 
At the same time, Ohio courts require expert opinions in civil cases 
to rise to the level of probabilities before being admitted under Rule 702.  
In Kerpelis v. Pfizer, Inc., an Ohio appella
nting evidence of products liability, a claimant must establish a 
causal connection by competent expert testimony, “and the proof in such 
case must establish a probability and not a mere possibility of such 
causal connection.”145  In Squires v. Luckey Farmers, Inc., an Ohio 
appellate court determined that causation expert evidence must be shown 
by probability, and that opinions to a lesser degree of certainty must be 
excluded as speculative.146  In Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. White 
Consolidated Industries, Inc., an Ohio appellate court stated flatly that in 
civil cases “[p]roof of causation must be by probability.”147 
Based on case law following Shumaker and D’Ambrosio, Ohio has 
set a precedent for a bifurcated Rule 702 test for relevance based on 
whether the case is civil or criminal.  This approach takes 
varying burdens of proof in the two types of cases, and the 
usefulness to the jury standard.148 
In 2006, the Ohio approach became law by statute for courts in the 
State of Georgia.  Pursuant to the Georgia Code, opinions of experts in 
criminal cases on “any question of
 141. State v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 675, 685 (Ohio 1995) (citing D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d at 915; 
State v. Bayliss, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1058-59, vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978)). 
 142. State v. Emerick, 670 N.E.2d 1060, 1062-63 (Ohio App. 1995) (citing D’Ambrosio, 616 
N.E.2d at 915).  The court also rejected the defense claim that the D’Ambrosio position on expert 
opinions to possibilities was merely dicta.  Id. at 1063 n.2. 
 143. State v. Jones, 739 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio 2000). 
 144. Id. at 315. 
 145. Kerpelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01-CV-1310, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2700, (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 7, 2004) (citing Stacey v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 101 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ohio 1951); OHIO R. 
EVID. 702). 
 146. Squires v. Luckey Farmers, Inc., No. 01-CVC-320, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4462, at *9 
(citing Shumaker v. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 44, 46 n.3 (Ohio 1986)). 
 147. Donegal Mut. Ins. v. White Consol. Indus., 852 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ohio 2006) (citing 
Shumaker, 504 N.E.2d at 44). 
 148. See infra section IV. 
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shall
pplying this code section, the courts of this state may 
or 
exp
case in  a heightened showing, consistent with Daubert, 
befo
 criminal, demonstrating a new and sensible analysis 
of R
ISSUE 
r 
bo
and the criminal cases, allowing expert opinions on possibilities.  The 
Ohio
 
 always be admissible.”149  Meanwhile, the Georgia Code precludes 
admissibility of expert opinions in civil cases until the court determines 
those opinions are based on sufficient facts and data, based on reliable 
principles, and the principles have been applied reliably to the facts of 
the case.150  Further, the code specifically mentions that it is the intent of 
the legislature that: 
the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert 
evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in 
interpreting and a
draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in 
[Daubert, Joiner, and Kuhmo]; and other cases in federal courts 
applying the standards announced by the United States Supreme Court 
in these cases.151 
Based on the statutes, Georgia also applies a split-standard f
ert relevance, allowing testimony on all scientific issues in criminal 
s and requir g
re expert opinions are admissible in civil trials.  Further, the statute 
specifically mentions a restrictive view on expert opinion admissibility 
in civil cases.152   
Based on case law or by statute, Ohio and Georgia have a split 
approach to Rule 702 admissibility of expert opinions, based on whether 
the case is civil or
ule 702 relevance. 
IV. OHIO REPRESENTS A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO THE RELEVANCE 
The split approach from Ohio offers considerable advantages fo
th the civil cases, under the expert opinion probabilities requirement, 
 solution offers a practical resolution of the federal and state court 
disputes on the level of certainty required for an expert opinion before it 
is admissible as reliable under Rule 702. 
 149. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67 (2006). 
 150. Id. § 24-9-67.1(a). 
 151. Id. § 24-9-67.1(f). 
 152. See id. 
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A.  In Civil Cases, Rule 702 Relevance Should Require Expert 
Opinions to a Probability 
Under Rule 702, an expert’s opinion may only be admitted to assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue.  
For civil cases, expert opinions should rise to the level of probabilities 
before being relevant for the jury’s consideration under the Rule 702 
standard.  This standard appropriately takes into account the burden of 
proof, prevents the invitation of speculation by the jury, avoids 
absurdity, and takes into account other appropriate concerns regarding 
the role of experts in civil litigation. 
1.  Requiring Probabilities in Civil Cases Appropriately Takes into 
Account the Preponderance of the Evidence Burden of Proof 
Admission of expert opinion to a probability is based on deference 
to the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof in civil cases.  The 
first federal appellate decisions on Rule 702 relevance relied heavily on 
the connection to the burden of proof in requiring expert testimony to a 
level of probability.153  State decisions since then echo this concern.154 
In Paoli, the Third Circuit recognized that relevance of expert 
opinions is measured by the ability of the scientific research or test to 
address the particular factual disputes in the case.155  Since the 
substantive standard for civil torts is preponderance of the evidence, the 
court concluded that the admission of expert testimony necessarily must 
reflect that burden of proof.156  Therefore, when the burden of proof is 
the preponderance of the evidence, expert opinions to a possibility or 
even “strong possibility” do not assist the trier of fact, and are therefore 
inadmissible as not helpful to the jury under Rule 702.157 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Daubert II mirrors the Paoli concern 
with the issue of the substantive burden shaping the relevance of expert 
testimony under Rule 702.  In Daubert II, the court recognized that the 
burden of proof required the plaintiffs to prove the medication more 
 153. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 
F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 101-106. 
 155. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 
1985)). 
 156. Id. at 750-51. 
 157. Id. 
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likely than not caused their injuries.158  To do so, the court reasoned that 
the relative risk must exceed “2.0” for the risk to have been more than 
doubled, making the injuries more likely than not caused by the 
medication.159  Based on this civil standard of preponderance of the 
evidence, the court determined that evidence of possibilities tends to 
disprove legal causation since it is inadequate for the jury to make a 
positive finding.160  Therefore, the Daubert II court held that the 
evidence should speak “clearly and directly” to an issue in dispute in the 
case,161 and only opinions stated to probabilities do so in a civil case 
with the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Similar logic underscores multiple other federal and state civil 
cases evaluating expert opinions.  In Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., a 
federal district court evaluated expert opinions in light of the Indiana 
standard requiring a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases.162  The 
court stated that “testimony as to mere possibilities will not alone suffice 
to place a fact in issue.”163  Expert opinions relating a “hypothetical or 
inferential causal relation between a drug and a disease is not probative 
and cannot provide the basis for a reasonable finding of fact.”164  
Therefore, the court held that opinions of the plaintiff’s experts in the 
case did not rise to the level at which they would assist the jury in their 
determinations as required under Rule 702 and should be excluded.165 
The Texas Supreme Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. 
Haven stated that Rule 702, in requiring courts to determine if expert 
opinion will assist the jury to determine a fact at issue, offers 
“substantive guidelines in determining if the expert testimony is some 
evidence of probative value.”166  Therefore, relying on the 
epidemiological analysis of Daubert II and similar cases, the court 
affirmed that only evidence to a risk of “2.0” is relevant to the case for a 
finding of causation to a preponderance of the evidence.167 
 158. Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320 (citing Jones v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 
403 (Cal. App. 1985)). 
 159. Id. at 1321 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 
1990)). 
 160. Id. at 1321 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. at 1321 n.17. 
 162. Porter v. Whitehall Lab. Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1992).  
 163. Id. at 1346 (citing Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind. 
1982); Watson v. Med. Emergency Serv. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 164. Id. at 1345. 
 165. Id. at 1352. 
 166. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997). 
 167. Id. at 717 (citations omitted). 
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The Wyoming Supreme Court mirrored this restrictive analysis in 
Hoy v. DRM.168  After determining that the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions 
were stated only to a possibility, the court held that the lack of 
probability in the opinions “prevents their opinions from being ‘helpful’ 
to the jury as contemplated by [Rule] 702.”169  The opinions fail to assist 
a jury to make a determination to a preponderance of the evidence, and 
as such, fail to be relevant to the issues in the case under Rule 702.170 
Together, these cases from both federal and state courts indicate the 
interrelationship of the preponderance of the evidence standard and Rule 
702 relevance, and uphold the requirement that expert testimony to 
probabilities is required to merit Rule 702 relevance in civil cases.171  
Rule 702 opinion testimony to a probability of the evidence takes into 
account the civil standard of proof.  This standard appropriately requires 
litigants to obtain experts who can testify that the jury should find, more 
likely than not, that their analysis is correct.  Anything less invites 
speculation. 
2.  Expert Opinions to Probabilities for Rule 702 Relevance 
Prevent Speculation 
Case decisions in Daubert II, Paoli, Porter, Havner, and Hoy show 
the requirement that Rule 702 opinions must rise to probabilities to assist 
the jury.  These cases and other appellate decisions also demonstrate one 
major danger of permitting possibility opinions in civil cases – inviting 
speculation. 
The Daubert II court first addressed the issue of speculation and 
how it relates to Rule 702 relevance and probabilities.  The court 
cautioned that expert opinions to a probability should speak “clearly and 
directly” to an issue in the case, but also that the court must be careful 
not to permit lesser testimony that can mislead the jury.172  The jury can 
be misled by possibilities evidence because it is an insufficient basis on 
which to rest a finding to a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Hoy decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the speculation issue first addressed in Daubert II.  In Hoy, the 
expert testified to causation in the form of possibilities.173  The court 
 168. Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268, 1284 (Wyo. 2005). 
 169. Id. at 1284.  
 170. Id. 
 171. To the extent that several other courts permit possibilities, such as Hanford, Ramirez, or 
the Illinois cases, they are evaluated infra section IV(A)(2). 
 172. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 173. Hoy, 114 P.3d at 1284. 
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determined that, under Rule 702, the experts’ opinions on possibilities 
were not helpful to a fact at issue since they were not an appropriate 
basis for a jury to make a finding to a preponderance of the evidence.174  
However, the court also noted that, since the experts lacked a basis to 
ask the jury to make a finding to a preponderance of the evidence, the 
possibilities opinions were “merely asking [the] jury to speculate,” 
because the analytical gap between the legally inadequate opinions and a 
finding of causation was too great.175 
Similarly, in the Cockrell v. LeMaire case from the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, the court stated that expert opinion evidence must rise 
to the level of probabilities and cannot address possibilities.  Otherwise, 
“the expert is merely speculating, [and] he is in no better position than 
the jury to form an opinion and his speculations should be excluded.”176 
In contrast, the cases permitting expert testimony to a lesser degree 
of certainty then probabilities - Hanford, Ramirez, and the Illinois 
cases177 - invite speculation. 
In Hanford, the court permitted the experts to testify to causation 
that does not meet the “2.0” relative risk established in Daubert II.178  
Relying on prior radiation exposure case law, the court determined that 
any exposure could cause the injuries, so no requirement for a doubling 
dose would be required.179  Based on this determination, a plaintiff in the 
lawsuit exposed merely to a background level of radiation, less than the 
“2.0” level of relative risk, may present expert evidence that his or her 
cancer was caused by the defendants and invite the jury to speculate that 
the causation has been established as more likely than not.  Opening the 
door for the jury to make a finding on inadequate evidence, less than a 
“2.0” risk level, is an invitation to speculation.180 
The Colorado Supreme Court decision in Ramirez also invites 
speculation since, in overruling prior civil cases requiring evidence to 
rise to the level of probabilities, the court expressly permits experts in 
civil cases to provide Rule 702 opinions not rising to the level of the 
burden of proof.181  While the court states that evidence that is reliable 
 174. Id.; supra text accompanying note 169. 
 175. Id. at 1284. 
 176. Cockrell v. LeMaire, No. COA03-327, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 142, at *3 (N.C. App. 
January 20, 2004) (citing State v. Bowen, 139 N.C. App. 18, 31-32 (N.C. App. 2000)). 
 177. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 178. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 179. Id. (citing In re Three Mile Island Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 727 n.179 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 180. But see supra notes 58, 77 and accompanying text. 
 181. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 379-80 (Colo. 2007).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 111-120. 
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under Daubert-like analysis is not speculative and, therefore, is 
appropriate for the jury’s consideration, the analysis more appropriately 
applies to criminal cases alone and fails to establish that the same 
reasoning on usefulness applies in the civil context.182 
While evaluated under a modified-Frye analysis, Illinois case law 
also shows the dangers of permitting testimony on possibilities in civil 
cases.  In Wojcik, the court permitted an expert physician to testify to 
opinions to the level of possibility, stating that “[a] physician may testify 
to what might or could have caused an injury despite any objection that 
the testimony is inconclusive.”183  The court, therefore, leaves the jury to 
decide whether the totality of the evidence meets the burden of proof. 
The court’s analysis leads to difficulty in a Rule 702 context because, as 
a matter of law, courts admit expert opinions solely to assist the trier of 
fact in an area of specialization outside of common knowledge.184 
When possibilities opinions enter into evidence, expert testimony is 
presented to the jury on issues for which the jury must make complex 
determinations of sufficiency and credibility.  These technical or 
scientific issues address areas in which the jury has little or no prior 
knowledge to independently evaluate the experts.  The situation created 
by admitting possibilities, therefore, invites the jury to speculate on 
issues outside their knowledge and to make necessarily uninformed 
decisions. 
Cases addressing the relevancy prong of Rule 702 and denying 
expert opinions on possibilities reject the invitation to speculation by 
requiring probabilities from experts, based on the civil burden of proof. 
3.  Opinions to a Probability Avoid the Absurdity of Experts 
Testifying on Issues to a Possibility and, as a Member of the 
Jury, Voting Otherwise 
In addition to accounting for the burden of proof and rejecting an 
invitation for speculation, the Ohio requirement in civil cases for opinion 
testimony to rise to probabilities before Rule 702 relevance is 
established also avoids absurdity. 
One canon of judicial interpretation is to avoid interpreting a statute 
 182. Id.  For an analysis of why Ramirez is correct in the criminal context only, see infra 
section IV.B. 
 183. Wojcik v. City of Chicago, 702 N.E.2d 303, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 184. FED. R. EVID. 702 and advisory committee notes to 1972 proposed rules (citing Ladd, 
supra note 8, at 418). 
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or rule in a manner that creates an absurd result.185  Permitting an expert 
to testify to an opinion held only to a possibility results in an absurd 
situation: the expert testifies on an issue, on behalf of her client, when 
the expert would not be able to make a finding on that issue in the 
client’s favor.  In other words, the expert testifies when he or she could 
not vote on the issue in the manner he or she is advocating.  Rule 702 
interpretation cannot result in this absurd situation. 
This absurdity is touched upon in the Mississippi case Catchings v. 
State.  In the case, the court noted that, within the medical community, 
the standard for fact-finding is a “reasonable medical certainty.”186  As a 
result, “if a physician cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so 
as to make a medical judgment, neither can a jury use that information to 
reach a decision.”187  The Catchings court requires a medical certainty or 
probability prior to admissibility, and in doing so, avoids the absurdity 
issue raised by opinions on possibilities. 
In addition to the Catchings analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Kuhmo cautions that the overriding concern of Daubert’s gatekeeping 
function is to ensure that an expert “employs in the courtroom the same 
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”188  In that context, the expert testifying to an opinion 
to a possibility, if asked and applying the same intellectual rigor to the 
field, must confess that he or she could not make a finding on that issue 
to a probability, as the jury is being asked to do.189 
To avoid the pitfalls of the expert in a civil case testifying to 
possibilities, the better practice is for courts to deny Rule 702 relevance 
to possibility opinions in civil cases, consistent with the Ohio example.  
By applying the Ohio interpretation of Rule 702, courts avoid absurdity, 
consistent with black letter rules of judicial interpretation, preserve the 
expert’s credibility when cross-examined, and apply the same level of 
intellectual rigor in the courtroom as in the laboratory. 
 185. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1992) (interpreting statute); Perry v. 
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (interpreting statute); Fallen v. United States, 378 
U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (interpreting federal rules of criminal procedure).  See generally John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393-2431 (2003) (discussing the 
absurdity rule in American law). 
 186. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1996) (citing Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 
2d 1351, 1354 (Miss. 1981)). 
 187. Id. at 597 (citing Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d. Cir. 1991)). 
 188. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
 189. See FED. R. EVID. 704 (opinion on ultimate issue). 
31
Jurs: A Sensible Approach to Rule 702 Relevance
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
JURS_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:54 PM 
640 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:609 
y 
relevant. 
b. Outside-the-
ssibilities would be contrary to logic, precedent, 
 
4. Other Concerns 
Ohio case law admitting only probability opinions in civil cases 
includes considerations of the civil burden of proof and the goals of 
resisting jury speculation, and avoiding absurdity.  In addition to these 
concerns, the Ohio rule also has several other results that positively 
affect the aims and role of the judicial process. 
a. Differences Between Legal Relevance and Practical 
Relevance 
First, the Ohio rule requiring probabilities opinions in civil cases 
takes into account a major distinction between legal relevance and 
practical relevance.  A possibility opinion may, as a practical effect, 
persuade the jury to vote in favor of the expert’s opinion.  However, it 
legally should not do so when only to the level of possibility since it, as 
a matter of law, is an insufficient basis for a verdict. 
The concern of practical versus legal relevance is addressed in 
Porter v. Whitehall Industries, when the court states “[a]n opinion 
tending to sway the jurors is not equivalent to an opinion tending to 
prove a fact.  When evidence would merely affect a lay person’s 
‘irrational’ opinion about a fact rather than providing reliable proof of 
that fact, the evidence is neither probative nor admissible.”190  
Therefore, to avoid the irrational effects of practical relevance, the better 
approach is to deny admissibility to possibilities opinions as not legall
Negative Effect of Possibilities on the 
Courtroom Practices of Professionals 
A second concern in favor of the Ohio rule is the effect of the Rule 
702 standard on the practices of professionals outside the courtroom 
when they must defend against possibilities opinions in negligence 
cases.  In the context of medical malpractice litigation, the California 
Court of Appeals addressed this concern in Simmons.  In Simmons, the 
court rejected the invitation to permit recovery on evidence rising only 
to possibilities, relying on three major practical effects on physicians.191  
The court therefore determined that, because of these effects, permitting 
recovery based on po
 190. Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335, 1345 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
 191. Simmons v. West Covina Med. Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 705, 706 (Cal. App. 1989). 
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deny
mons, as violating sound logic, legal 
prece
 
ublic policy.192 
One effect of permitting recovery on possibilities is to “encourage 
costly and unreasonable over-testing and over-treatment for defensive 
purposes.  Physicians would find it necessary to place the requirements 
of the legal system before the needs and finances of the patient.”193  The 
concern of courtroom standards for evidence therefore can have direct 
and negative effects on patient care in a health care conte
 rule restricts this concern, as the court did in Simmons. 
The second effect of permitting recovery on possibilities is that “the 
physicians’ increased exposure to liability would adversely impact 
already high medical malpractice premiums, resulting in an upward 
spiral of consumer costs.”194  While written in 1989, the opinion 
correctly anticipated the effect insurance rate and consumer cost 
difficulties would have on the practical ability of health care providers to 
practice.195  To limit this effect, a court should limit physicians’ 
exposure to inadequate lawsuits by applying the Ohio relevance rule
ing admissibility to expert opinions rising only to a possibility. 
The effect of expert opinions to possibilities does not solely affect 
health care providers, as discussed in Simmons.  Rather, the concern 
extends to other professionals, including those practicing law.  The 
California Court of Appeals addressed this concern in Dumas v. Cooney, 
where the court cautioned that recovery from professionals for 
possibilities would extend beyond the Simmons situation with 
physicians, and allow a disgruntled litigant to sue his or her own 
attorney for a negative verdict.196  Such results are to be avoided for the 
same reasons as stated in Sim
dent, and public policy.197 
Finally, the Simmons court theorized that the uncertainty created by 
allowing recovery based on possibility opinions would “open the 
 192. Id. at 705. 
 193. Id. at 705-06. 
ope, 
e ED.  622 (2003). 
7 (citing Simmons v. West Covina Med. Clinic, 212 Cal. App. 3d 705, 705-06 
 194. Id. at 706. 
 195. See, e.g., Alaistair MacLennan, M.D., Karin B. Nelson, M.D., Gary Hankins, M.D., & 
Michael Speer, M.D., Who Will Deliver Our Grandchildren? Implications of Cerebral Palsy 
Litigation, 294 JAMA 1688 (2005); Richard E. Anderson, M.D., Defending the Practice of 
Medicine, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED.  1173 (2004); Robert G. Brooks, M.D., Nir Menachemi, Ph.D., 
Cathy Hughes, M.S.W., & Art Clawson, M.S., Impact Of The Medical Professional Liability 
Insurance On Access To Care In Florida, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2217 (2004); Patrick J. H
R forming the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 114 AM. J. M
 196. Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1609 (Cal. App. 1991). 
 197. Id. at 160
(Cal. App. 1989)). 
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cure the just, 
spee
ing 
insurance premiums, and to prevent overburdening the legal system. 
undance of caution 
prior
d be excluded per Daubert II, as they are under the Ohio relevance 
test. 
nt and admissible under Rule 702 if it rises to the level of 
 
proverbial floodgates of our overburdened judicial system.”198  While 
unrelated to the defendant’s liability, this practical effect deals with the 
administration of justice and the ability of the justice system to handle 
large numbers of suits effectively.  The Ohio interpretation preventing 
this result, then, is consistent with the judicial interpretation of both the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence: “to se
dy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”199 
The effect of admission of possibilities opinions dictates use of the 
Ohio rule in civil liability cases in order to prevent defensive practices 
by health care or other professionals, to limit growth of skyrocket
c. Special Role of Experts in Lawsuits Mandates Caution 
The special and persuasive role of experts in litigation is an 
additional practical reason to limit the admissibility of possibilities 
opinion evidence.  Because experts testify necessarily on areas in which 
the jury lacks knowledge, the jury lacks the ability to evaluate the 
testimony critically.200  Because the lack of knowledge can be 
misleading to a lay jury, the courts should use an ab
 to admitting weak expert opinions into trial.201 
The Daubert II court recognized this concern, stating that since the 
expert role in the case is one so potentially “powerful and . . . 
misleading,” the courts should exclude opinions with the potential to 
mislead the jury unless clearly related to the issues in the case.202  An 
expert opinion to the level of possibilities lacks legal relevance, but can 
be powerful and misleading due to the practical effect of persuasive 
expert opinions.  Because of this result, expert opinions to a possibility 
shoul
Analysis of the interrelationship of the burden of proof and Rule 
702 relevance, the discouraging of speculation, the role of absurdity in 
judicial interpretation of Rule 702, and the other effects of the Ohio rule 
leads to the conclusion that in civil litigation an expert opinion should 
only be releva
 198. Simmons, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 706. 
 199. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  See also FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 200. See supra section IV.A.3 and text accompanying notes 188-189. 
 201. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (citing Weinstein, supra 
note 23, at 632. 
 202. Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995).  
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esolution of a factual dispute.   “Expert testimony which 
does
opriately takes 
into 
n a criminal case in evaluating 
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probabilities. 
In Criminal Cases, the Correct Rule 702 Relevance Standard is 
Expert Opinions to a Possibility 
In contrast to civil litigation, expert opinions stated as possibilities 
should be admitted in criminal cases for jury consideration under Rule 
702.  The criminal cases permitting expert admissibility on possibilities, 
Ford, Ramirez, and D’Ambrosio, contrast with other cases that strictly 
hold to the probability standard, and show the practicality of the Ohio 
Rule 702 relevance rule.  The Ohio rule appropriately acc
 that results from admitting possibilities in civil cases. 
The Admission of Expert Opinions to Possibilities Takes into 
Account 
Cases Examining Rule 702 Expert Testimony in the Criminal 
Context 
The Daubert opinion cautioned that relevance under Rule 702 
required “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a 
precondition to admissibility.”203  Part of this analysis is to determine 
whether the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts to aid the 
jury in the r 204
 not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non 
helpful.”205 
Consistent with the Ohio case law, the relevance standard under 
Rule 702 should require expert opinions in civil litigation to rise to 
probabilities prior to being admitted.206  This result appr
account the burden of proof, declines to invite speculation, avoids 
absurdity, and has significant beneficial practical effects. 
However, Rule 702 relevance is appropriately modified in the 
criminal case law based on the criminal burden of proof.  Expert 
opinions to possibilities can assist a jury i
vidence and resolving a factual dispute, so the opinions retain their 
relevance for admission under Rule 702. 
Cases evaluating the relevance of expert testimony in criminal 
 203. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 204. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d. Circ. 1985)).  See 
also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92). 
 205. Id. at 591 (citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 11, at 702-718). 
 206. See supra section IV(A). 
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ether the defendant participated in the crime.   The 
Ford
es in the robbery.  The Third Circuit decided this 
is “c
 
cases recognize the affect of the burden of proof in criminal cases on 
Rule 702 relevance.  In United States v. Ford, the Third Circuit’s 
evaluation of the testimony of a shoeprint identification expert began 
with the Daubert standard that relevance requires the evidence to assist 
the trier of fact.207  Although the expert testified only that the shoes the 
defendant wore “could not be ruled out” as a source of the shoeprint at 
the crime scene, the testimony remained relevant because the testimony 
is probative of wh 208
 court reiterated that the standard for relevancy, in this context, “is 
not that high.”209 
Unlike the civil litigation context, where the shoe imprint testimony 
would not be helpful to the jury to decide liability until it became 
probable that the shoe was the defendant’s, the expert testimony in Ford 
does help the jury in their overall analysis of whether the defendant 
participated in the robbery by tying the shoes he wore when 
apprehended to the sho
learly relevant” to the issues, and should be admitted even if only in 
terms of possibility.210 
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly evaluated expert testimony 
under Rule 702 in its decision in Ramirez.211  The court first determined 
that Rule 702 requires relevance and reliability prior to admissibility.212  
When determining relevance, the issue is one of usefulness to the 
jury.213  Usefulness is based on “whether there is a logical relationship 
between the proffered testimony and the factual issues in the case.”214  
The court then evaluated the expert testimony of the pediatric nurse 
practitioner, who testified that the physical findings of her evaluation of 
the victim were “suspicious.”215  Since the criminal case hinged on 
whether the victim had been assaulted, and the opinion contradicted the 
emergency department physician who had examined the victim and 
 207. United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). 
 208. Id. at 220-21 (citing United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1346-47 
(8th Cir. 1984)).  Participation in the crime, of course, is established under the beyond the 
a
3, 600 (3d Cir. 1998) 
u Yard PCB Litig. 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)). 
eople v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323 (Colo. 2003)). 
re sonable doubt standard. 
 209. Id. at 219 (citing Lauria v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 59
(q oting In re Paoli R.R. 
 210. Id. at 220-21. 
 211. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 378 (Colo. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 378 (citing People v. Shreck, 22 P.3
 213. Id. at 379 (citing Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77). 
 214. Id. (citing P
 215. Id. at 381. 
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stated the exam was normal, the nurse’s testimony had a “direct logical 
relation” to the factual issues in the case.216  Ot
ft with the misleading impression that the health care providers who 
examined the victim agreed that the examination was normal. 
Expert testimony to a possibility is also appropriately admitted as 
relevant under Rule 702 by the Ohio Supreme Court in D’Ambrosio.217  
Similar to the nurse in Ramirez, the coroner in D’Ambrosio testified that 
the victim’s wounds “could have been made by” the weapon in evidence 
at trial.218  The testimony by the coroner demonstrates to the jury “that, 
despite contrary appearances, the size of the wound was consistent with 
the size and shape of [the knife in evidence].”219  Because of the 
helpfulness to the jury in understanding the evidence at trial, the 
testimony had Rule 702 r 220
 a misleading impression that the knife was unable to make the 
wounds on the victim. 
Similar to Ford, the Ramirez and D’Ambrosio decisions 
demonstrate that expert testimony that fails to rise to the level of 
probability can, in criminal cases, be appropriately considered by the 
jury.  The Ohio solution to Rule 702 relevance permits
nce for criminal cases based on the varying jury determination to 
be made under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
The Ford, Ramirez, and D’Ambrosio decisions stand in contrast to 
the criminal opinions that required expert opinions stated to a 
probability: Catchings and State v. Young.221  In Catchings, the court 
determined that any testimony that failed to rise to the level of 
reasonable medical certainty would not be admissible.222  The testimony 
in Catchings was from a physician who, after the defendant struck the 
victim with a sawhorse, treated the victim for seven weeks pri
.223  The expert failed to state his opinions to a reasonable medical 
certainty, so ordinarily the testimony would be inadmissible.224 
In Catchings, the court did admit the testimony in the end.225  The 
 216. Id. at 382 (citing Martinez, 74 P.3d at 323). 
 217. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 915 (Ohio 1993). 
9605-CC-
6, at *61-62 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998). 
So. 2d at 597. 
 98. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1996); State v. Young, No. 01C01-
00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 56
 222. Catchings, 684 
 223. Id. at 597-
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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e Ohio approach permits the evidence 
with
consistent with the basic principle of Rule 
702 
court determined that, while he had not stated so, the physician’s opinion 
“evidences the certainty required for admission.”226  In doing so, the 
court reached the correct result consistent with the basic principles of 
Rule 702 relevance.  Instead of making a finding that the testimony was 
to a probability when it did not contain that certainty, the court could 
have applied the “split standard” for Rule 702 relevance from Ohio, 
consistent with the underlying purposes of Rule 702 opinions as stated 
since Daubert.  Since the issue of the physician’s opinion on death 
related to a fact at issue in the case, whether or not the defendant caused 
the victim’s death and is guilty, th
out the court requiring a retrospective approach to the testimony and 
a post hoc finding of probability. 
A similar result is seen in State v. Young from the Tennessee Court 
of Criminal Appeals.  In that case, the medical examiner testified to the 
results of his examination of the victim but, as in Catchings, failed to 
testify to a “reasonable medical certainty.”227  While the court 
determined that Tennessee law requires testimony to a reasonable medial 
certainty to be relevant under Rule 702, the court evaluated the specific 
language used by this medical examiner and, like Catchings, determined 
that the “doctor’s responses were clear and unequivocal.”228  Therefore, 
his testimony was “not so speculative that it was not of substantial 
assistance to the jury.”229  Just as in Catchings, the Young decision 
shows that, in lieu of verbal gymnastics to ensure an opinion is deemed 
to be to a probability, the better approach is to permit testimony to a 
possibility.  This approach is 
admissibility since Daubert: to help the jury evaluate a fact at issue 
and the evidence in the case. 
The Ohio approach permits expert testimony in criminal cases 
under a Rule 702 standard admitting possibilities, which allows 
testimony on issues useful to the jury by appropriately adjusting the 
relevance standard for the criminal law burden of proof.  Criminal cases 
taking a dogmatic approach to expert testimony often reach the same 
result.  However, courts applying the dogmatic approach must stretch 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. State v. Young, No. 01C01-9605-CC-00208, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 566, at *62 
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998). 
 228. Id. at *64. 
 229. Id. at *65.  The Court does find harmless error in the admission of some medical examiner 
testimony that was “indefinite and vague” and “invited speculation,” but those responses of the 
medical examiner are so indefinite as to time that they could have been inadmissible under the 
possibilities standard under the Ohio rule.  Id. at *65-66. 
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their analysis of the expert opinions in order to find that they are to a 
probability, and therefore admissible.  An adjustment of the relevance 
standard reaches the same result through the application of pre-existing 
rules and considerations.  The Ohio evaluation 
 that is appropriate to the issues in those trials even though the same 
nce would not be admissible in civil cases. 
2.  Absurdity Issue for Civil Cases Not Present for Criminal Cases 
Permitting expert testimony rising to the level of possibilities in 
criminal cases, under the Ohio approach to Rule 702, does not invite 
absurdity as in civil cases.230 
In the context of civil cases to a preponderance of the evidence, the 
admission of possibilities testimony permits an expert to opine on an 
 on which he or she could not make a finding in favor of his or her 
client as a member of the jury.231  By permitting this result, the civil 
courts’ dogmatic approach results in an absurdity.232 
However, in the criminal law context, expert testimony to a 
possibility does not result in an absurdity.  For example, in Ford, the 
prosecution expert testifying on the shoe print compa
ibility could, as a theoretical jury member, vote for conviction.  The 
same is true for the nurse in Ramirez, the coroner in D’Ambrosio, the 
physician in Catchings, and the medical examiner in Young. 
As a result, the split-relevancy approach to Rule 702 excl
ibilities in civil cases because of the absurdity of the result, but 
permits expert opinions to a possibility in criminal cases when the 
absurdity no longer is an issue due to the varying standard of proof. 
Expert opinions to the level of possibilities can, in the criminal 
context, help the jury evaluate the evidence and determine facts while 
avoiding the misleading impressions of the events that could result if the 
opinions are not admitted.  Analysis of the interrelationship of the 
criminal burd
sible when only
ibilities. 
 230. See supra section IV.A.3. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The 1993 Supreme Court decision in Daubert determined that Rule 
702 provided the appropriate test for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and that expert testimony should be deemed both reliable and 
relevant prior to admission at trial. 
Since 1993, federal and state courts have evaluated the issue of 
Rule 702 relevance with different results.  Federal appellate decisions 
shortly after Daubert, such as Daubert II and Paoli, determined that 
expert opinions should only be admitted as relevant under Rule 702 
when they rise to the level of probabilities.  Multiple federal district 
courts since Daubert II and Paoli adopted this approach. 
More recently, federal appellate decisions in cases such as Hanford 
and Ford admitted expert testimony stated as possibilities.  The 2004 
decision of Judge Blackburn in Kaiser-Hill denied that Rule 702 requires 
expert opinions to any particular level of certainty. 
State courts also have varying approaches to the issue.  Some states, 
like Mississippi in the Catchings and Kidd cases, require expert 
testimony to rise to the level of medical probability prior to admission in 
both the civil and criminal context.  On the other hand, other states like 
Colorado permit expert testimony of possibilities in both civil and 
criminal cases.  In contrast to both the Mississippi and Colorado 
examples, the state of Ohio adopted a split approach for Rule 702 
relevance in D’Ambrosio: permitting expert testimony of possibilities in 
the criminal context but insisting expert opinions rise to the level of 
probabilities to be relevant in civil cases. 
The Ohio example in D’Ambrosio offers a sensible approach to the 
Rule 702 relevance issue.  Requiring expert testimony to probabilities in 
civil cases appropriately takes into account the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  In addition, the standard avoids an invitation to jury 
speculation and absurdity of an expert’s position vis-à-vis their client’s 
claims, both of which would result from admitting expert opinions to 
possibilities.  Finally, the requirement of expert opinions to probabilities 
in civil cases has several other beneficial effects: it takes into account the 
difference between practical relevance to sway a jury and legal relevance 
to make a finding; it reduces out-of-the-courtroom practice changes for 
professionals seeking to avoid exposure to liability based on 
possibilities; and it mandates caution for the judicial process based on 
the special persuasive effect of experts to a lay jury. 
The Ohio example for Rule 702 relevance also appropriately 
permits expert opinions rising to the level of possibilities in criminal 
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g the cases permitting 
expe
ount the burdens of proof in 
civil and criminal cases and balancing the effects on litigants.  It should 
be adopted by other jurisdictions as a practical and bright-line approach 
to determine Rule 702 relevance and, therefore, admissibility of expert 
opinions with varying levels of certainty. 
cases.  This approach permits expert opinions that assist the jury in 
evaluating the evidence, making a determination on a fact at issue, and 
avoiding misleading impressions of evidence by permitting greater 
leeway in their level of certainty.  In analyzin
rt testimony to possibilities, such as Ford, Ramirez and 
D’Ambrosio, the possibility expert opinions that were admitted 
appropriately assisted the jury to resolve the issues in those cases, and, 
therefore, maintained relevance under Rule 702. 
The Ohio split approach is a sensible way to analyze Rule 702 
expert opinion relevance, taking into acc
41
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